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Home > Regulation Best Practice > How Much Independence for Supervisors in Financial Market Regulation?

Regulation Best Practice

How Much Independence for Supervisors in Financial Market Regulation?

by Marc Quintyn

Executive Summary

  • The degree of political independence that financial supervisors should enjoy is a hotly debated topic.

  • This is because financial supervisors are a “one of a kind” breed of regulatory agency. They supervise the sector that is at the heart of the allocation of capital in any society, and therefore attract much political interest, not only in normal times, but even more so in times of crisis.

  • While a fair degree of independence is justified—institutionally, in their regulatory and supervisory work, and financially—independence alone will not establish the right incentive structure for supervisors.

  • Agency independence is not a goal in itself. It is just one institutional arrangement that should assist in establishing a governance framework that provides the regulatory agency with the right incentives to discharge its delegated powers. The other three elements are accountability, transparency, and integrity.

  • Accountability arrangements ensure that the agency maintains legitimacy towards its stakeholders. This legitimacy will support independence, as will accountability.

  • Transparency and integrity arrangements play an important role in making independence and accountability effective.

  • These four elements of regulatory governance keep each other in equilibrium, and together establish the right incentives for the agency to fulfill its mandate, and for its stakeholders to refrain from interfering.

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Further reading

Books:

  • Bovens, Mark. “Public accountability.” In E. Ferlie, L. Lynne, and C. Pollitt (eds). The Oxford Handbook of Public Management. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004.
  • Das, Udaibir, and Marc Quintyn. “Financial crisis prevention and crisis management—The role of regulatory governance.” In Robert, Litan, Michel Pomerleano, and V. Sundararajan (eds). Financial Sector Governance: The Roles of the Public and Private Sectors. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2002.
  • Quintyn, Marc, and Michael Taylor. “Robust regulators and their political masters: Independence and accountability in theory.” In Donato Masciandaro, and Marc Quintyn (eds). Designing Financial Supervision Institutions: Independence, Accountability, and Governance. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2007.

Articles:

  • Hüpkes, Eva, Marc Quintyn, and Michael Taylor. “The accountability of financial sector supervisors: Theory and practice.” European Business Law Review 16:6 (2005): 1575–1620.
  • Kydland, Finn, and E. Prescott. “Rules rather than discretion: The inconsistency of optimal plans.” Journal of Political Economy 85:3 (1977): 473–491.
  • Majone, Giandomenico. “Strategy and structure: The political economy of agency independence and accountability.” Designing Independent and Accountable Regulatory Agencies for High Quality Regulation: Proceedings of an Expert Meeting in London, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, January 10–11, 2005: 126–155.
  • Quintyn, Marc, Silvia Ramirez, and Michael Taylor. “Fear of freedom—Politicians and the independence and accountability of financial sector supervisors.” IMF Working Paper 07/25, Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund, 2007. Also in Donato Masciandaro, and Marc Quintyn (eds). Designing Financial Supervision Institutions: Independence, Accountability, and Governance. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2007.
  • Quintyn, Marc. “Governance of financial supervisors and its effects—a stocktaking exercise.” SUERF Studies (2007/4): 64
  • Rogoff, Kenneth. “Optimal degree of commitment to an intermediate monetary target: Inflation gains versus stabilization costs.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 100 (1985): 1169–1189.
  • Williamson, Oliver. “The new institutional economics: Taking stock, looking ahead.” Journal of Economic Literature 38:3 (2000): 595–613.

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